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Winning Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic
Outbidding in Northern Ireland and
Cyprus
GAVIN MOORE, NEOPHYTOS LOIZIDES, NUKHET A. SANDAL and
ALEXANDROS LORDOS
Ethnic outbidding in divided societies can have dire political consequences, ranging
from the derailment of peace processes to inter-ethnic warfare. This article investigates
the conditions contributing to successful outbidding within the framework of protracted
peace negotiations by using the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus.
Evidence demonstrates that successful outbidders are able to exploit the fears of their
communities with respect to inter-ethnic compromise while identifying appropriate strat-
egies and opportunities for redressing these grievances. The article demonstrates that
the degree of outbidding success over the long term derives from combining diagnostic
and prognostic frames linked to credible political and constitutional strategies.
Ethnic outbidding occurs in the context of electoral politics when political
parties compete for support within an ethnic group, having few incentives to
cultivate support from other ethnicities. Each ethnic party seeks to demonstrate
that it is more nationalistic than its competitors by raising its ‘bid’, protecting
itself from claims by intra-group opponents that it is ‘soft’ on ethnic issues
(Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Horowitz 1985; Mitchell et al. 2009). Once this
auction-like scenario begins, the ethnic outbidding thesis predicts that the
resulting extremist discourse will destabilise and ultimately prevent conﬂict
regulation in divided societies.
In this article, we shed light on the mechanisms that underlie the
consequences of ethno-political competition, and account for the variation in
outbidding outcomes – in other words, why ethnic outbidding succeeds and
why it fails. The article will ﬁrst explore the Northern Irish case where the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) supplanted the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)
as the leading party of Unionism after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. We
then examine post-2004 Cyprus, in which the Democratic Party (DIKO), the
Social Democrat Movement (EDEK), and the European Party (EUROKO),
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failed to outbid the moderate Democratic Rally (DISY or ‘the Rally’), despite
overwhelming rejection of the ‘Annan Plan’ by the Greek Cypriots in a
referendum. The former case is one of success, whereas the latter ended up as
a failure for the outbidders. The electoral fortunes of the UUP and the Rally
post-referendum illuminate how the contrasting outcomes of outbidding
affected both parties, with a clear downward trend for the UUP (see Figure 1)
in contrast to the DISY’s relative success in elections.
By examining the cases of ethnic outbidders in the Northern Ireland and
Cyprus peace processes, this article establishes a framework that accounts for the
variation in outbidding outcomes. The study of ethnic outbidding has important
implications for research on intra-group conﬂict because if the conditions for
successful outbidding are understood, then policymakers will have a better
chance of minimising its impact on vulnerable peace processes (Brubaker and
Laitin 1998: 434). Whether outbidding succeeds or fails matters not only for the
fate of inter-ethnic compromise, but also for the moderate parties who become
vulnerable by their support of an agreement (Horowitz 1985: 354).
Speciﬁcally, we argue that the degree of ethnic outbidding success in the
long term depends on the ability of ethnic parties to both:
• address the grievances of their own ethnic group with respect to
inter-ethnic compromise, and
• identify appropriate frames, strategies and institutional opportunities for
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FIGURE 1
UUP AND DISY LEGISLATIVE ELECTION PERFORMANCE IN COMPARISON

























In the case of the former, this may involve an ethnic party appearing robust on
issues such as cultural identity by not accepting any concessions. The latter
involves ethnic parties moderating their stance on issues that may be less
salient to their group, such as inter-ethnic cooperation on economic issues.
Outbidding may succeed in the short term where ethnic interests are plainly at
stake – e.g. in peace referendums – but its long-term success is compromised
by parties that are unwilling to adapt and moderate their positions to the new
political or institutional opportunities. In this respect, Northern Ireland and
Cyprus could tell us an insightful story particularly with regard to
power-sharing engagements and party adaptation emerging from this binary
comparison.
We begin by outlining ethnic outbidding theory in literature; then we
explore how framing and party adaptation could broaden our understanding of
outbidding theory. We also support our theoretical observations with primary
material such as polling data, party speeches, and author-conducted interviews.
We explore these arguments in the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and
Cyprus, assessing the overall validity of our claims.
Ethnic Outbidding and Peace Processes
By their very nature, ethnic parties in divided societies represent the interests
of, and receive support solely from, a speciﬁc ethnic group rather than compet-
ing for a plurality of votes. The seminal authors of the ethnic outbidding
thesis, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), argued that political preferences are
distributed along a Downsian uni-dimensional issue space with members of
each ethnic group clustered at opposite ends of a linear scale (Downs 1957).
For instance, an ethnic party representing Serbs in Bosnia will compete intra-
ethnically with another Serbian party, rather than with parties representing
Muslims or Croats (and vice versa). Ethnic outbidding is the result of this
peculiar form of political competition in divided societies. Parties within the
same ethnic group seek to portray themselves as the true defenders of the
group while simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of in-group rivals
(Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty 2008: 44).
The only way for ethnic parties to gain votes is to outbid their rivals in an
auction-like scenario, resulting in parties raising their own bids, so that intra-
ethnic rivals move from the conciliatory centre towards the extremes (Horowitz
1985: 345). The outbidding thesis predicts that hard-line parties will beneﬁt
from substantial vote switches from moderate parties compromising their posi-
tions during peace mediations (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). This movement
toward the extremes damages both intra- and inter-ethnic relations, as groups
become suspicious of the increasingly hard-line behaviour of their ethnic coun-
terparts.
The centrifugal character of ethnic outbidding can radicalise ethnic groups,
undermine multi-ethnic alliances, and lead to violent outcomes as witnessed in
several seminal studies of the Sudan (Horowitz 1985), Moldova (Kaufman

























1996), and Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2005). Of particular concern is the effect of
outbidding on inter-ethnic compromise, peace processes, and the electoral
consequences for moderate parties. In addition to the UUP example discussed
below, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) was outbid by the United
National Party and its calls for a ‘Sinhala-only’ language policy after the SLFP
signed the 1957 Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact with ethnic Tamils
(DeVotta 2005). Likewise, among both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots outbid-
ding has proven to be an electorally appealing formula in several critical
elections in the past decades. The National Unity Party (UBP, Ulusal Birlik
Partisi) of Derviş Eroğlu defeated the moderate Turkish Republican Party
(CTP, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat in the deci-
sive April 2010 elections ending renewed progress in the 2009–10 peace talks.
Equally, in the 2003 presidential elections, Greek Cypriot hardliner Tassos
Papadopoulos defeated Glafkos Clerides despite the latter’s success in ﬁnalis-
ing accession negotiations with the European Union. A decade earlier Clerides
himself outbid another moderate, President George Vasiliou, by denouncing his
earlier support for the Set of Ideas1 aiming for the reuniﬁcation of the island.
Despite this seemingly inexorable logic of outbidding, the literature has
failed to address the variation that exists in outbidding outcomes during and
after peace mediations. Not only did a cluster of anti-Annan Plan parties fail to
outbid the Democratic Rally in Cyprus, but there are also examples of outbid-
ding failure across post-conﬂict societies; in Croatia (Hislope 1997), Angola
(Kornprobst 2002), and India (Chandra 2005). Relevant scholarship has shown
that outbidding during contested mediations did not earn electoral rewards for
its adherents. By not specifying this variation in outcomes, the literature leads
to an undue degree of pessimism about its consequences.
Recent studies have called for more speciﬁcation on the conditions where
outbidding is ‘more or less likely’ to pay off (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 434).
Giuliano (2000: 296) stated that ‘a convincing theory of ethnic mobilisation
should be able to account for variation in outcomes, for cases of frustrated as
well as successful mobilisation along ethnic lines’. This article makes use of
recent reﬁnements to ethnic outbidding literature, namely Mitchell et al.’s ethnic
tribune thesis (2009) as well as comparative institutional theory on consocia-
tional engagements (McGarry and O’Leary 2009). Our aim in this paper is
twofold. First, to clarify the variation in outbidding outcomes particularly during
decisive moments of brokering peace by comparing the success and failure of
outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Second, we link the two cases with
regard to relevant policy lessons, particularly following renewed interest among
Cypriot mediators on the institutions of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.
(Dis)contents of Outbidding: Politics of Identity and Framing
We argue that successful outbidding appeals are those that contain both
identity-based frames addressing grievances of the target ethnic group, as well
as opportunity frames in rectifying a contested peace process. The concept of

























outbidding implies that ethnic parties will almost always offer an identity-based
frame, but the longevity of outbidding success depends on ethnic parties offer-
ing opportunity frames tied to credible political and constitutional strategies.
Literature on framing, a process whereby actors jointly interpret, deﬁne, and
redeﬁne states of affairs, becomes especially relevant in the study of
outbidding. Frames build on pre-existing cultural stock drawn from the identity
of a community, the basis of outbidding claims. Frames involve the construction
of shared meanings of a situation, whether a problem exists and what solutions
are possible (Desrosiers 2011; Gray 2004: 167). Parties use ‘diagnostic frames’
which identify the source of a problematic situation, such as inter-ethnic
compromise, and attribute blame in an attempt to exploit the group’s fears.
At the same time, the ‘prognostic frame’ establishes those opportunities
for change that seem viable and effective. Prognostic frames contain the iden-
tiﬁcation of appropriate opportunities and strategies for redressing the problem
as well as an assessment of the efﬁcacy of alternative strategies (Desrosiers
2011; Snow and Benford 1988). We argue that the presence of a prognostic
frame in ethnic politics emphasising credible political and constitutional
strategies is a necessary condition for successful outbidding. Under what con-
ditions are parties likely to choose appropriate framing strategies? The frames
that ethnic parties employ are shaped by political learning in response to
incentives, whether domestic institutional or created by external actors. For
one thing, party adaptation is a rational response to such incentives including
appropriate institutional design with regard to speciﬁc demands and needs of
the peace process. Furthermore, political parties could better balance national-
ist constituencies in peace processes, if they have credible support from the
international community including supportive external ‘peace allies’ (Sandal
and Loizides 2013).
In the long term, successful outbidding parties are those that adapt by
taking moderate positions on practical issues so as not to undermine the
gains of inter-ethnic rapprochement their community approves of. In a reﬁne-
ment of earlier outbidding theory, Mitchell et al. (2009) found that although
voters endorse ‘ethnic tribune’ parties that are deemed to be the most robust
defenders of their group, they may also expect these parties to act in a more
conciliatory way. Effective outbidding, especially in democratic systems, is
one that does not eliminate the prospect of mutually advantageous inter-
ethnic cooperation. Ethnic groups want their ‘strongest voice’ yet they do not
want their ethnic champions to damage stable peace arrangements (Mitchell
et al. 2009: 403).
Places Apart? Northern Ireland and Cyprus in Comparison
We have chosen the Northern Irish and Cypriot cases because they share char-
acteristics that make them particularly fruitful for comparison.
Both cases are demonstrative of the outbidding process because they
exhibit a binary group structure: Nationalist or Unionist in Northern Ireland

























and Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus. While parties that do not
explicitly deﬁne themselves as belonging to one of these groups exist, they are
not as electorally salient, nor do voters signiﬁcantly cross the communal divide
in elections.2 Table 1 contextualises the political parties and their attitudes to
compromise for the remainder of this article.
To varying degrees both cases are inﬂuenced by the British colonial legacy
on each island and subsequent decolonisation, although Northern Ireland
continues to have a more substantial British inﬂuence. Both cases feature com-
peting ethno-national claims on territorial status, a partitioned island, and fear
of gradual demographic reversal (Anastasiou 2008; Kitromilides 1979; Tonge
2005). Greek Cypriots and Irish Nationalists wish to reverse partition,3
reuniting the two islands under a shared jurisdiction. For the most part, Turkish
Cypriots and Unionists (particularly those on the right) wish to maintain the
current (de facto) borders, claiming the right of self-determination remains
within the units of the Turkish North and Northern Ireland as opposed to the
whole of their respective islands. Moreover, Unionists wish to maintain North-
ern Ireland’s status within the United Kingdom. These groups’ aspirations and
identities are inﬂuenced by the pull of outside powers, Britain and Ireland for
Unionists and Nationalists in Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey for Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus (Bekerman et al. 2009).
The role of ‘motherland countries’ in each case can be been seen as having
both an exacerbating and mediating inﬂuence on the respective conﬂicts
(Wright 1987). Much international attention has been paid to Northern Ireland
and Cyprus in peacemaking efforts (Byrne 2006). Consociationalism, that is
non-territorial power-sharing between antagonistic groups, has been a
prominent feature of international thinking, from British and Irish involvement
in the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement4 to the active role of the United States in
the 1998 Belfast Agreement.5 In Cyprus, the United Nations and more recently
the European Union have attempted to induce compromise, culminating in
various versions of the Annan Plan in the early-to-mid 2000s (Loizides 2014).6
Given the striking similarities between the two cases, comparative stud-
ies have aroused much interest among academics (Bekerman et al. 2009;
TABLE 1
PARTIES AND POTENTIAL OUTBIDDERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CYPRUS
Ethnic group
Lead ethnic party within
each ethnic group at
beginning of peace process
Potential outbidders after political
settlement was drafted/introduced
Unionists (1998) Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
Irish Nationalists (1998) Social and Democratic
Labour Party (SDLP)
Sinn Féin (SF)
Greek Cypriots (2002) Democratic Rally (DISY) Democratic Party (DIKO); European
Party (EUROKO); Social
Democratic Movement (EDEK)
Turkish Cypriots (2009) Turkish Republican Party
(CTP)
National Unity Party (UBP);
Democratic Party (DP)

























Bose 2007; Byrne 2006; Lijphart 1996; O’Duffy 2003; Sandal and Loizides
2013). Similarly, policymakers have engaged in multiple attempts to transfer
knowledge across the two cases during the past ﬁve years; for instance, the
DUP’s Jeffrey Donaldson and Sinn Féin’s Mitchel McLaughlin were invited to
Cyprus in October 2011 to share their experiences of the Northern Irish peace
process (ENGI 2012), while at the same time the UN mediation team in
Cyprus has included, among other international experts, Professor John McGar-
ry, a leading scholar on consociationalism with a decisive contribution to the
Northern Irish peace process (see McGarry and O’Leary 2009).
We recognise that the cases differ in crucial aspects. Chieﬂy, while the
principle of consent7 in Northern Ireland means its constitutional status is sub-
ject to change, the majority on both sides consider the violent aspects of the
conﬂict to be over. Although the conﬂict in Cyprus has remained largely non-
violent after partition, neither side would consider the situation resolved. As
our case studies will explore, in only one of the cases was a peace agreement
implemented whereby a majority of Unionists and Nationalists endorsed the
Belfast Agreement in the 1998 referendum, whereas a majority of Greek Cyp-
riots rejected the Annan Plan in the 2004 referendum. Finally, in Northern Irish
elections the two communities vote for a devolved government while in
Cyprus the Greek Cypriot side effectively controls the internationally recogni-
sed government of the Republic. While these distinctions make the electoral
behaviour of the two cases slightly different, ethnic politics appear equally
dominant in the periods we examine in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus.
The DUP’s New Clothes: Outbidding and the Fall of the UUP
In the 2003 Assembly election, a major realignment within Unionism occurred
as the UUP lost its position as the leader of the unionist community it had
maintained for over 80 years to the DUP (Tonge 2005: 60). By signing up to
the peace deal, the UUP was expected to be the main beneﬁciary of the 1998
Good Friday Agreement, which brought the conﬂict to an end. Instead, the
DUP was to solidify its position in subsequent elections despite opposing the
Agreement. We argue that the DUP’s success stems from the party’s ability to
exploit Unionist grievances with the Agreement, without taking hard-line posi-
tions on practical issues that would undermine stability and the gains of the
peace process for Unionism.
Intra-Unionist competition features numerous cleavages in terms of ideol-
ogy, identity, and attitudes towards compromise. Since its beginnings in 1905
as an offshoot of the Ulster Unionist Council, the UUP has been a centre-right
party.8 In contrast, the DUP has been considered right-wing on social issues,
but leftist in its socioeconomic policies (Evans and Duffy 1997: 53).
Disagreement between the parties over how best to secure the union natu-
rally fostered resentment between the parties, with the more dogmatic DUP
keen to target any perceived compromises by the UUP to Irish Nationalism
(Farrington 2001: 56–57). Outbidding rhetoric from the DUP’s founder, Ian

























Paisley, was a constant thorn in the side of the UUP despite the latter’s
continuing electoral dominance throughout the 1970s and 1980s. For example,
Paisley publicly denounced then-UUP leader Brian Faulkner’s ‘betrayal’ over
the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement with the Nationalists. The DUP acquired a
reputation as the party to ‘most eloquently articulate the siege mentality of
absolute opposition to a united Ireland under all circumstances’ (Mitchell 1991:
71). Although comparatively moderate, the UUP also had its own moments of
intransigence, with a large section of the party standing as anti-Sunningdale
candidates in the 1973 Assembly election. Concerned about the DUP and dis-
sent within the party, the UUP protected itself in the 1980s and early 1990s by
not risking any further inter-ethnic compromise (Cochrane 2001: 323).
The UUP and DUP brieﬂy put aside their hostilities to jointly oppose the
1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.9 However, the ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign stunted
DUP growth, demonstrated by its disappointing performance in the 1987 West-
minster election (Walker 2004: 234–39). The 1990s saw the DUP’s outbidding
resume over the UUP’s involvement in the peace process. Paisley claimed that
then UUP leader David Trimble was going to ‘sell out the union’ (Cochrane
2001: 371). The deal that emerged from the peace process altered the dynamics of
TABLE 2
SELECTED UNIONIST ELECTION RESULTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Election type Year UUP (%) Change since last result DUP (%) Change since last result
Assembly 1973 25.3 – 10.8 –
1982 29.7 +4.4 23.0 +12.2
1998 21.25 –8.45 18.14 –4.86
2003 22.7 +1.45 25.6 +7.46
2007 14.9 –7.8 30.1 +4.5
2011 13.2 –1.7 30.0 –0.1
Westminster 19741 36.5 – 8.5 –
1979 36.6 +0.1 10.2 +1.7
1983 34.0 –1.6 20.0 +9.8
1987 37.8 +3.8 11.7 –8.3
1992 34.5 –3.3 13.1 +1.4
1997 32.7 –1.8 13.6 +0.5
2001 26.8 –5.9 22.5 +8.9
2005 17.7 -9.1 33.7 +11.2
20102 15.2 –2.5 25.0 –8.7
European 1979 10.0 – 29.8 –
1984 21.5 +11.5 33.6 +3.8
1989 22.2 +0.7 29.9 –3.7
1994 23.8 +1.6 29.2 –0.7
1999 17.6 –6.2 28.4 –0.8
2004 16.6 –1.0 32.0 +3.6
20093 17.1 +0.5 18.2 –13.8
Notes: 1UUP and DUP in United Ulster Unionist Council, a body of Unionists opposing the Sunn-
ingdale Agreement; 2UUP in electoral alliance with UK Conservative Party; DUP backed two
Unionist independent candidates to avoid splitting Unionist vote; 3Ex-DUP MEP Jim Allister, lea-
der of TUV won 13.7%.
Source: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/.

























Unionist rivalry, concretising Unionist competition between the anti-Agreement
DUP and the pro-Agreement UUP (Evans and Tonge 2005: 324).
Outbidding from the DUP’s formation in 1971 to the early 1990s had only
delivered modest growth for the party, demonstrated by the electoral trends in
Table 2. Yet in the post-Belfast Agreement atmosphere, the party surged past
the UUP and consolidated this position in subsequent elections since 2003.
Such has been the electoral dominance of the DUP that there is a growing
belief the UUP may even merge with the DUP. Indeed, two high-proﬁle ﬁgures
from the UUP left the party in response to the DUP–UUP electoral pact for
the 2013 Westminster by-election in Mid-Ulster (BBC 2013).
How did the DUP’s Outbidding Strategy Lead to Success?
The peace process made the UUP vulnerable to counter-mobilisations from its
outbidding competitor. The resulting agreement was a turning point in the
DUP’s outbidding strategy, with DUP representative Clive McFarland suggest-
ing that if the UUP had not signed the Agreement, it would have been more
difﬁcult for the DUP to achieve electoral success.10 The DUP adapted its mes-
sage, addressing Unionists’ grievances without taking a hard line on practical
issues such as opposing power-sharing with Nationalist parties. In other words,
the DUP did not only present a diagnostic frame that just identiﬁed the prob-
lem but also emphasised the opportunity to choose an alternative strategy,
promising to defend Unionist interests more robustly and effectively.
Polls preceding the referendum had already given an indication of what
was to follow with regard to Unionist apprehensions. Speciﬁcally, only 4 per
cent of Protestants believed Unionists beneﬁted a little or a lot more than
Nationalists from the Agreement (Evans and O’Leary 2000: 87). The 1998
referendum results reﬂected these fears, with a slim 55 per cent Protestant
majority backing the Agreement. This number dropped to a minority only three
years later as Unionist conﬁdence in the Agreement dissipated for a number of
reasons (MacGinty 2004: 90). Chieﬂy, Unionists protested that the Agreement
put Sinn Féin in government with no guarantee of decommissioning;11 released
paramilitary prisoners; radically reformed the Royal Ulster Constabulary police
force; and provided for Irish Nationalist vetoes in the Assembly over major
issues (Powell 2008: 104). The DUP argued that the Agreement signalled the
end of the union and used diagnostic frames to reshape Unionist perceptions of
the acceptability of this compromise.12 Paisley denounced the UUP as ‘ofﬁce
seekers who are prepared to sell their souls for ofﬁce’ (Farrington 2001: 51).
This ethnic outbidding discourse of betrayal resonated with Unionist fears and
came at the UUP’s expense, overshadowing many ‘victories’ for Unionism in
the peace agreement such as the de facto acceptance of the legitimacy of the
Northern Irish state by the Nationalists.
The DUP also exploited Unionist fears by outbidding the UUP on identity-
based issues. Once violence stopped, antagonisms manifested themselves in
symbolic arenas, with identity politics becoming an increasingly important way

























of pursuing the conﬂict by other means (Hill and White 2008: 44). The
controversy over policing reform is one such example. Unionists had always
considered the police ‘their’ force, with Nationalists distrustful of its majority
Protestant membership and accusing it of bias and brutality (McGarry 2000).
Before the Agreement, only 20 per cent of Protestants believed the police
should change its symbols to reassure Catholics (Irwin 2006: 2). Unionists
were incensed by the 1999 Patten Report that emerged from the Agreement,
which recommended changing the emblem and name from the RUC to the
Police Service of Northern Ireland (McGarry 2000: 180). In response, the
DUP’s Ian Paisley Jr. argued that the removal of the RUC symbols completely
ruined anything linking the police service to the British (BBC 2001). His
father claimed that ‘Patten’s programme is that Protestants have to be ethni-
cally cleansed’ (Farrington 2001: 52). Four years after the report, 58 per cent
of Protestants believed reform had gone too far.13 In the 2001 Westminster
election, the UUP had lost support due to police reform as DUP leaders were
able to blame their rivals with responsibility for the report as part of the wider
peace package (Mitchell et al. 2001: 730).
By catering to Unionist fears, the DUP could set itself up as the Unionists’
ethnic tribune, a factor crucial to successful ethnic outbidding. Mitchell et al.
(2009: 412) found that 40 per cent of the UUP’s supporters perceived the DUP
to be more effective defenders of Unionist interests, with only 7 per cent of
DUP supporters believing the UUP to be the more effective. In the 2003
election, the UUP lost 22 per cent of its 1998 support to the DUP, with only 4
per cent going the other way (Mitchell et al. 2009: 406).
After the 1998 referendum loss, the DUP tried to attract Unionists who had
given a ‘soft’ Yes to the Agreement.14 Crucial to the DUP’s successful outbid-
ding was the party’s adaptation around the time of the Agreement. Outbidding
had previously produced only modest electoral growth. The party successfully
adapted its hard-line positioning to the new environment, cannily pointing to
the Agreement’s more sensitive issues yet also offering a viable alternative,
demonstrating the party had abandoned its wholly rejectionist position.15 As
we will discuss in the Cyprus case, long-term ethnic outbidding success is
dependent on such adaption and prognostic framing.
This strategy stemmed from its desire not to undermine the gains of the peace
process. Local politicians now had control of Northern Ireland’s affairs after 26
years,16 Unionism was gaining international credibility, and inter-communal
violence had substantially decreased (McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 51). Further-
more, the devolved institutions were generally popular, with support for the
establishment of the Assembly rising from 57 per cent to 70 per cent amongst
DUP supporters between 1998 and 2003, and only 13 per cent of Protestants
rejecting power-sharing in 2007 (McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 56). Unionists
clearly signalled that they wanted a determined ethnic tribune but they also
wanted the DUP to act in a more conciliatory way (Mitchell et al. 2009).
The DUP’s adaptation was most evident in power-sharing with Sinn Féin,
in which the party’s position changed from one of total resistance to laying out

























conditions Sinn Féin would have to meet to form a government. The 2006 St.
Andrews Agreement17 has restored power-sharing for the longest period in
Northern Ireland’s troubled history, with a DUP–Sinn Féin-led executive at the
helm. Moreover, the party’s position on policing moderated, accepting the
PSNI and the devolution of policing powers in the 2010 Hillsborough Agree-
ment. The party’s adaption since 1998 led to accusations that it had ‘stolen the
UUP’s clothes’ (Mitchell et al. 2001).
Institutional innovations in the Agreement itself may also have inﬂuenced
this choice of framing strategy. The Executive was formed on the basis of the
d’Hondt procedure which accords cabinet seats on the basis of party strength,
effectively guaranteeing the DUP, the UUP, the SDLP, and Sinn Féin a place
in the cabinet (O’Leary et al. 2005). By rotating its ministerial positions and
refusing to talk with Sinn Féin, the DUP could still claim to be ‘outside’ the
process, outmanoeuvring the UUP, without destroying the new arrangements.18
In fact a similar process of ethnic outbidding took place on the Nationalist side
with Sinn Féin outbidding the moderate SDLP (see Table 1) while at the same
time adopting a pragmatic approach within the institutions of the shared
d’Hondt administration.
Alternatively, one could argue that the DUP’s post-agreement success was
due to the UUP’s organisational weakness. However, this explanation remains
unconvincing. Despite its fragmented structure and high-proﬁle departures to
the DUP, the UUP had many resources at its disposal, evidenced in support for
its position in the referendum campaign from civil society organisations and
leading international ﬁgures. More importantly, the party had dominated
Unionist politics since its formation in 1905, as it was effectively organised
around state institutions from 1921, and had closer links with the main Protes-
tant network organisation, the Orange Order (Evans and Tonge 2009; Walker
2004). Thus, while party organisation may inﬂuence outbidding, it may not be
as signiﬁcant a factor as party adaptation and framing of available political and
constitutional options.
In brief, despite losing the referendum, the DUP was able, in McFarland’s
words, to ‘tap into the mood, and press the case against the Agreement’.19 The
DUP addressed Unionist grievances in its outbidding whilst identifying
appropriate prognostic frames, thus ensuring the party enjoyed long-term ethnic
outbidding success.
‘Rally’ Around the Flag: The Failure to Outbid the DISY
In the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan V, the Democratic Rally was the
only major Greek Cypriot party to campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote. The results were
particularly disappointing for the party – an overwhelming 76 per cent of Greek
Cypriots rejected the Plan.20 The failure of parties that were opposed to the Plan
– DIKO, EDEK, and EUROKO – to subsequently absorb DISY voters who
voted ‘No’ is puzzling, constituting a failure for each of these parties’ outbid-
ding strategies. Clearly Greek Cypriots had grievances regarding Annan, so












































Parliamentary 1981 31.92 – 19.5 – 8.2 – – –
1985 33.56 +1.64 27.65 +8.15 11.07 +2.87 – –
1991 35.8 +2.24 19.5 –8.15 10.9 –0.17 – –
1996 34.5 –1.3 16.4 –3.1 8.1 –2.8 – –
20011 34 –0.5 14.8 –1.6 6.5 –1.6 3 –
20062 30.3 –3.7 17.9 +3.1 8.9 +2.4 5.8 +2.8
2011 34.28 +3.98 15.76 –2.14 8.9 0.0 3.88 –1.92
Presidential
1st/2nd round
1993 36.74 / 50.31 – – – – – – –
19983 40.1 / 50.8 +3.36 – – – – 0.91 –
20034 38.8 / – –1.3 51.5 – – – 2.12 +1.21
20085 33.51 / 46.63 –5.29 31.79 / – –19.71 – – – –
20136 45.46 / 57.48 +11.95 – – 24.93 – – –
European 20047 28.23 – 17.09 – 10.79 – 1.65 / 10.8 –
2009 35.7 +7.47 12.3 –4.79 9.9 –0.89 4.1 –8.35
Notes: 1Contested as ‘KISOS’ rather than EDEK; 2NEO’s results until the party merged with EUROKO in 2005, contesting its last election under the ‘NEO’ label
in 2006; 3First round % change only; 4Papadopoulos won 51.5% in the ﬁrst round with support of AKEL; 5EUROKO backed DIKO’s Papadopoulos; 6DIKO
backed DISY’s Anastasiades; Giorgos Lillikas backed by EDEK while EUROKO split between Anastasiades and Lillikas; 7Giannakis (Ioannis) Matsis (For Europe)
result.
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why did these parties not beneﬁt electorally? We contend that the anti-Annan
camp did not identify appropriate strategies for redressing the Cyprus problem.
In other words, they did not use prognostic frames that focused on ending the
deadlock, which Greek Cypriots feared would entrench partition if it persisted.
Party competition in the Republic of Cyprus has been heavily shaped by
events after the de facto partition of 1974. Since its establishment in 1976 by
Glafkos Clerides, the Rally has identiﬁed itself as a centre-right party, drawing
support from all segments of society, including nationalists with sympathies for
the enosis movement21 as well as liberals supporting compromise with the
Turkish Cypriots. The Rally’s absorption of the EOKA-B22 sympathisers
marginalised the party in these formative years, with the Progressive Party of
Working People (AKEL) and the DIKO establishing an alliance to exclude the
DISY from government (Christophorou 2006: 517). The DIKO, a centrist
party, was also established in 1976 as the party of former President Spyros
Kyprianou (Christophorou 2007: 116).
The Rally overcame the AKEL–DIKO alliance to become the largest party
in the 1985 parliamentary elections. During the 1990s, the party attempted to
balance moderation with ethnic nationalism, with Clerides denouncing the Set
of Ideas in his 1993 presidential victory, and taking a tough line on defence
issues in his 1998 re-election. The impact of the Annan Plan negotiations in
the early 2000s had profound implications for party competition (Vural and
Peristianis 2008: 39–40). Before Annan, the Rally had begun to take a more
progressive line towards inter-ethnic compromise,23 supporting a ‘bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation’ and power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots (Kasoulides
1999). In echoes of the UUP and the Good Friday Agreement, the party’s
decision to endorse Annan caused splits within the party, with inﬂuential
hardliners defecting to form the EUROKO24 under ex-DISY parliamentary
spokesperson Demetris Syllouris. The DIKO and the EDEK resolutely rejected
the Plan, and were to play a key role in the ‘No’ campaign (Christophorou
2007: 120).
The Rally’s endorsement of the Plan appeared electorally risky, given
Greek Cypriot anxieties regarding the security provisions, refugee return, and
property issues (Anastasiou 2008; Yakinthou 2009). However, the DIKO, the
EDEK, or the EUROKO could not take advantage of these apprehensions in
subsequent elections (see Table 3).
Why were the anti-Annan parties unable to translate a short-term outbid-
ding success in the referendum to the longer-term position of Greek Cypriots’
ethnic champions?
Why did the Outbidders Fail to Undermine the Rally’s Support?
The anti-Annan camp was unsuccessful in its attempts to outbid the DISY due to
its inability to offer a prognostic frame, deepening fears that no progress in ﬁnd-
ing a solution would further entrench partition and lead to a decrease in interna-
tional sympathy for the Greek Cypriot side. Indeed, the anti-Annan parties did

























not alter their strategies after 2004, misreading why Greek Cypriots voted ‘No’
and also believing the prevailing conditions at that time precluded any need for
party adaption.
The Rally’s decision to say ‘Yes’ to Annan appears irrational in terms of
electoral incentives. Then President Tassos Papadopoulos (former president of
the DIKO) campaigned vociferously for a No vote in a major boost to outbid-
ding strategies. In an emotional television address, he invited Greek Cypriots
to ‘say no to the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus’ (Christophorou 2005:
89). The 'Jχι (No) campaign was also supported by large sections of the
media, the church, and civil society organisations (Yakinthou 2009: 152–54).
Despite this opposition, the Rally backed a ‘Yes’ vote with a 78 per cent
majority at its party congress. Strikingly, 65 per cent of DISY supporters
would vote against their party in the referendum (Christophorou 2005: 91 and
96). Lordos (2006: 8) found that the cumulative effect of security provisions,
settler issues, and property rights was far more likely to inﬂuence how a Greek
Cypriot voted than allegiance to the party line on the Cyprus issue. Much like
the UUP’s David Trimble, the Rally leader Nikos Anastasiades favoured a
solution but had not secured a comfortable majority amongst DISY
supporters.25 Nevertheless, the ‘Jχι campaign failed to translate into substantial
electoral gain for the DIKO (only 2 per cent of DISY supporter’s switched
votes in 2006) or the EDEK (only 1 per cent). Notably the Democratic Rally
did not have to deal with the difﬁculties associated with the implementation of
the peace settlement,26 raising an intriguing ‘what if’ for the UUP case.
We contend that whilst Greek Cypriots were clearly apprehensive of the
Annan Plan V, they did not totally endorse the anti-Annan parties’ diagnostic
frames, which rejected the settlement in its totality. DISY former representative
Katie Clerides argues that the party respected the No vote, whereas the rejec-
tionists may have been undermined by the negativity of their arguments.27 The
Rally’s 3.7 per cent loss of their total vote in the 2006 parliamentary elections
was seen as a victory, given their internal divisions and the unfavourable refer-
endum outcome (Christophorou 2007: 121–22). Despite the DIKO’s improving
electoral performance, the 2006 results fell short of party expectations while
the EDEK made only marginal gains. The anti-Annan parties all endorsed
Papadopoulos’ re-election campaign in 2008, yet surprisingly the latter failed
to make it to the second round of voting. Survey data collected after these
elections suggested that supporters of the DIKO/EDEK/EUROKO and the
Rally did not signiﬁcantly differ in terms of reconciliation with the Turkish
Cypriots, ethnocentrism, pro-uniﬁcation attitudes, and anti-partition beliefs.28
The existing differences were insufﬁcient to warrant a ‘No-based’ pre-electoral
campaign by the Papadopoulos camp, with anti-solution framing more likely to
‘turn off’ Papadopoulos’ own supporters.
Ironically, the outbidding strategies and campaigning of the anti-Annan
parties were in direct contrast to the advice of their leading communication
advisor. Speciﬁcally, in documents leaked to the press his recommendation was
to avoid ‘brutal patriotic propaganda’, to ‘hide the doctor’ (a reference to the

























father ﬁgure of Greek Cypriot nationalism Dr Lyssarides), and to ‘soften their
language towards moderation’ (Christoﬁlopoulou 2011).
The Rally’s approach was closer to public sentiment on bi-communal feder-
alism, a position that attracted those voters who were ambivalent – but not
opposed to – the peace process. By way of contrast, the anti-Annan parties
misread the public mood,29 adopting an inappropriate framing strategy that
could not trump the DISY’s prognostic frame. The short-term outbidding suc-
cess in the referendum did not lead to displacement of the Rally as the Greek
Cypriot champion particularly in defending Greek Cypriot interests in the inter-
national scene. Although political party discipline had a role to play, it was
Greek Cypriots’ personal evaluation of the Plan that most affected their voting
behaviour (Lordos 2006: 12). Fears over property, settlers, and security did not
automatically translate into votes for the anti-Annan parties, even if the latter
reinforced a negative vote. These parties did not adapt their messages after
2004, perhaps believing they did not have to. After all Cyprus’ accession to
the EU was guaranteed irrespective of the referendum outcome (Loizides and
Keskiner 2004: 159).
A sovereign Cyprus in the EU, facing an unrecognised Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus and with a say over Turkey’s accession to the EU would,
from a Greek Cypriot standpoint, have a better bargaining position to draw a
more balanced compromise than Annan V. In such a climate, the anti-Annan
parties failed to recognise that the Greek Cypriots did not fully buy into their
prognostic frames, even if they could relate to their diagnosis. In a sense, the
Rally won the ‘battle of ideas’ over the future reuniﬁcation of Cyprus by tak-
ing a more conciliatory approach to a settlement.30 The party did not convince
its constituency to support the Annan Plan, yet it effectively argued that the
continuation of the island’s current status would lead to the worst possible out-
come, the entrenchment of partition.31
In contrast, the rival Democratic Party viewed the status quo as preferable
to what they perceived as a ‘non-workable solution’ (Christophorou 2005: 90),
though 10 per cent of its supporters disagreed, voting for the Plan (Lordos
2006: 7). The continued inﬂux of Turkish settlers and Greek Cypriot interna-
tional isolation after the referendum has strengthened the Rally’s push for a
solution (Anastasiou 2008; Trimikliniotis 2009). The EDEK and the
EUROKO’s vague ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus problem have under-
mined their outbidding appeals (Christophorou 2007: 117). By way of contrast,
in Northern Ireland the DUP’s prognostic frames and operation of the Agree-
ment’s institutions offered voters a viable alternative to the UUP.
The anti-Annan camp’s main outbidding strategy relied primarily on iden-
tity issues. For instance, the EUROKO deputy Nicos Koutsou accused the
DISY deputy Christos Pourgourides of ‘providing ammunition to the enemies
of Hellenism’ by signing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) agreement which looked into alleged abuses of Turkish human rights
in the Greek islands (Cyprus Mail 2009). Yet for each ethnic outbidding
attempt, the DISY responded by demonstrating its success in gaining key

























‘positions of inﬂuence’ within European institutions, for instance the
appointment of Pourgourides himself to the chairmanship of the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the PACE in 2010. Moreover, the Rally
was able to outmanoeuvre its competitors on identity issues, maintaining
stringent positions as compensation for moderation elsewhere. For example,
during elections the DISY leaders would maintain slogans such as ‘Cyprus is
Greek’, and during the referendum the party suggested the Greek ﬂag should
be the ofﬁcial one of the Greek Cypriot constituent state (Sandal and Loizides
2013).
We argue that framing has been a salient explanation of outbidding failure.
The DISY effectively framed its position as the most credible and effective
advocate of Greek Cypriot interests following accession to the EU, the referen-
dum, and international isolation after 2004. The party appeared much more
capable in adapting its frames in the post-accession period, opting to adapt ‘to
what its leaders perceived as new realities’ (Christophorou 2006: 520). This
move was vindicated in its electoral performance after 2004, most recently in
the May 2011 legislative elections, where the DISY emerged victorious with
34.3 per cent, and 38 per cent in municipal elections six months later. On the
other hand, the anti-Annan parties did not sufﬁciently adapt to these realities
and were too negative after their short-term success in the 2004 referendum –
quite unlike the situation in Northern Ireland, where the DUP showed its ability
to moderate after the referendum and the Good Friday Agreement.
It was only in the summer of 2012 that the DIKO leadership made a
pragmatic turn, breaking away from the ‘nationalist’ camp’ to support the
candidacy of Anastasiades for the presidency in the February 2013 elections.
The DIKO’s decision could partly be attributed to the effects of the Eurozone
crisis but also Anastasiades’ own increasing popularity. In principle, the DIKO
did not lack alternatives. In the year preceding the elections the party along
with the EDEK and the EUROKO attempted to resurrect the late Papadopoulos
2008 camp. Although the three parties have agreed on their main principles,
they failed to agree on a joint candidate. This failure further demonstrates the
divisions and weaknesses of ethnic outbidding in the case of Cyprus.
In the 2013 campaign, Anastasiades emerged as an example of an ‘ethnic
tribune’ deﬁned by Mitchell et al. (2009), with his poll ratings indicating that
he is the most capable and effective leader to negotiate with the outside world
on the Cyprus issue (higher than his own voters’ base) (CYBC 2012). Focus
groups run by the Rally’s communication advisors have further indicated that
even undecided voters felt that Anastasiades has attracted a team around him
consisting of the most effective political ﬁgures and technocrats in the island.32
The DISY candidate received 45.46 per cent of the vote in the ﬁrst round of
the elections and then secured 57.48 per cent in the runoff elections, the largest
popular mandate for a Cypriot president in decades. His campaign managers
have mainly emphasised Anastasiades’ international credibility and ‘team lead-
ership’ as one of his main strengths in the elections. His principled stance on
the Annan Plan which divided his party and put him at odds with most Greek

























Cypriots did not harm his campaign as priorities changed by 2013 and the
electorate prioritised instead Anastasiades’ ‘statesmanship and credibility’.
Yet his victory has also ended the electoral safety of serving in opposition
for almost a decade and has opened new challenges for ethnic outbidding. To
begin with, the DIKO has failed to outbid the DISY but through their electoral
alliance DISY’s leader has endorsed domestic limitations as to the management
of the bi-communal negotiations. A critical question for future research is who
will transform whom in the DISY–DIKO alliance and whether ethnic outbidders
will effectively defeat moderates in neutralising future peace initiatives. Inevita-
bly, the mismanagement of the Eurozone crisis in March 2013 and the treatment
of Cyprus in the bailout negotiations has demolished Anastasiades’ domestic
image and credibility. But if he eventually addresses the problems of the haem-
orrhaging economy, he will also be in a better position to balance his domestic
alliances with an ambitious attempt to resolve the Cyprus question.
Conclusions
We argue that ethnic outbidding is particularly successful when ethnic parties
address the grievances of their ethnic group whilst also identifying appropriate
political and constitutional strategies for redressing these concerns. The article
makes a twofold contribution to the study of framing in divided societies. First,
it identiﬁes the necessary components of ‘winning peace frames’ during critical
moments of ethnic outbidding competition. Second, the article challenges the
primary emphasis in framing literature on grievances and fears. In the hearts
vs. minds debate, our cases suggest that it is not so much sentiments per se
that determine the battle of ideas but rather which actors stand more credibly
to offer solutions. On this point, the article demonstrates that often the same
aggrieved constituencies are also potentially pragmatic in their political prefer-
ences. For the Greek Cypriot hardliners their self-imposed deadlock within the
EU offered very little prospect for an effective ‘nationalist’ programme in con-
trast to Northern Ireland’s power-sharing agreement, which offered Unionist
leaders the opportunities to revisit the most contentious parts of the agreement.
Yet there are other perspectives to consider before stating conclusively that
the framing of these opportunities is the key to outbidding outcomes. For
example, Chandra’s (2005) cross-cutting cleavages theory stipulates that out-
bidding may fail due to the presence of multiple cleavages across ethnicities,
forcing majorities to maintain moderate policies. Both cases do feature multiple
cleavages but they are not signiﬁcant enough to cross ethnic boundaries.
Cyprus arguably had fewer such alternative cleavages following the aborted
Annan Plan, yet ethnic outbidding failed in Cyprus despite the fact that the
DISY shares limited civil society links with the Turkish Cypriot community
compared to its left-wing and moderate rival the AKEL.
Another aspect of the ethnic tribune theory stresses the importance of
power-sharing institutions in producing centripetal moves towards inter-ethnic
cooperation by outbidders, provided that they can cover their ﬂanks (Mitchell

























et al. 2009: 397). The institutionalisation of ethnic identity is often criticised
for exacerbating rather than ameliorating ethnic conﬂict. In both cases, the
reiﬁcation of ethnic cleavages through consociational institutions or other
‘divisive means’ has been criticised for encouraging outbidding (Horowitz
1985). However, the differing outcomes in each case suggest caution with
regard to this argument; if anything, ethnic outbidding should have worked in
Cyprus since the effects of partition eliminated any opportunities to attract vot-
ers across communal lines.
Furthermore, the article’s main arguments could be extended to the Turkish
Cypriot community which ironically also demonstrates resemblance with our
Northern Irish case study. The moderate leftist CTP won the 2004 referendum
but subsequently lost elected ofﬁces in the North by 2010. The CTP leadership
failed to convince the electorate that Talat and his party could provide a better
settlement than the Annan Plan. In essence, the CTP found itself trapped
between its own determination for a settlement and Greek Cypriot post-2004
demands for additional concessions. Arguably, win–win institutional
arrangements might have made a difference in maintaining support for the
moderates; however, the two sides have ultimately failed to consider alternative
institutional arrangements of relevance to Cyprus.
In contrast, Cypriot moderates have invested all their fortunes in a
centripetalist compromise in 2009 (e.g. cross-voting for co-presidents) which
inadvertently contributed to their electoral defeat even before ﬁnalising the
peace talks. In line with Horowitz’s (1985) argument, Talat agreed that each
community in the island would have a minority vote in the election of each
other’s co-president. This compromise allowed hardliners to argue that Turkish
Cypriots would effectively lose their genuine representation and capacity to
defend their community interests. To this point our article demonstrates that
relevant comparisons among divided societies could be particularly critical not
only with regard to party strategies but also in identifying lessons in designing
negotiable and durable conﬂict-mitigating institutions.
Interestingly, the d’Hondt executive has recently become an attractive alter-
native for the Cyprus mediations stemming from its effectiveness in Northern
Ireland (Loizides 2014). While admittedly failing to prevent ethnic outbidding,
the d’Hondt executive encompassed hardliners in government and moderated
their positions, thus contributing to an unprecedented political stability. In con-
trast to Sunningdale, d’Hondt led to stable coalitions since May 2007 and, as
demonstrated in this article, even contributed to a working relationship between
Ian Paisley and Sinn Féin leader Martin McGuinness, previously sworn enemies.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates the importance of political adaptation
and effective framing linked to credible political and constitutional strategies.
The DUP enjoyed outbidding success and electoral reward by addressing the
grievances of the Unionists with the Belfast Agreement and maintaining the
party’s reputation as a robust defender of Unionism, whilst moderating its posi-
tion in terms of power-sharing and thus attracting previously reluctant UUP
voters disenchanted with the state of their party.

























In contrast, the outbidders in Cyprus were unable to attract the DISY
supporters who were unhappy with their party’s endorsement of the Annan
Plan. Although the DIKO, the EDEK, and the EUROKO were able to voice
Greek Cypriot grievances with varying degrees of success, none of the parties
offered a viable or appropriate prognostic frame. DISY was able to argue that
the rejectionists would entrench the status quo on the island, convincing its
own voters to stand by the party in subsequent elections.
An important addendum has arisen from our comparative study surround-
ing the short- and long-term success of ethnic outbidding. Effective framing
can achieve short-term successful outbidding where ethnic interests are plainly
at stake, such as a referendum. The anti-Annan parties’ success in 2004
contrasts with the DUP, whereby the UUP held off its challenge in part
because of the DUP’s overly negative framing before the Agreement.
Nevertheless, the ‘Yes’ victory in the 1998 referendum was tenuous. Paradoxi-
cally, when outbidders win referendums they also undermine the longevity of
their own outbidding strategy. Outbidders will only succeed as long-term
ethnic champions when they can displace their rivals through having a plausi-
ble prognostic frame as well as a diagnostic frame. The anti-Annan parties
most likely felt they did not need to adapt their message after the referendum
and were subsequently electorally punished for it. In this respect, analysing the
effects of short- versus long-term ethnic outbidding success promises an inter-
esting avenue for further research.
Polling data in both countries demonstrated that voter behaviour was
contingent on the framing of grievances and opportunities offered by parties
they would not usually vote for. That 40 per cent of the UUP’s own supporters
in 2003 should believe the DUP was a more effective voice for unionism
illustrates the link between grievances/opportunities and outbidding success.
The comparative inability of the anti-Annan parties to offer opportunities to
redress the Cyprus problem meant rejectionist framing was unattractive not
only to ﬂoating DISY voters but also to their own supporters.
This research also found that preventing or curtailing ethnic outbidding
is difﬁcult even in relatively successful peace processes. While democracy
offers the necessary structural mechanisms to promote accommodation,
electoral politics may encourage opportunistic elites to exploit ethnic
cleavages (DeVotta 2002: 96–97). Therefore, policymakers need to strike a
balance between in-group cohesion that prevents fragmentation and in-group
cohesion that reiﬁes antagonistic ethnic identities. Contested peace processes
are in essence inundated with questions of priorities and difﬁcult dilemmas.
As our comparison of Northern Ireland and Cyprus suggests, rather than
maintaining a protracted deadlock, it is arguably better to embrace peace,
however risky this might be politically with regard to ethnic outbidding or
other negative side effects. Peace processes require reasonable and often
unavoidable electoral risks while maintaining a balance between pragmatism
and identity politics.


























1. In 1992, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attempted to facilitate talks
between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiating parties by outlining a plan of a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.
2. In Cyprus, the post-partition electoral system prevents Greek Cypriots voting for Turkish
Cypriot parties and vice versa. In Northern Ireland, only 7 per cent of Catholics would con-
sider voting for the leading Unionist party, the DUP, and only 3 per cent of Protestants would
consider voting for the leading Nationalist party, Sinn Féin in a recent poll. As a majority of
Catholics are Nationalist and a majority of Protestants are Unionist, the terms are often used
interchangeably. Though debated among academics, religion is seen as a good indicator of
group behaviour in Northern Ireland. See LucidTalk 2012 poll: http://www.lucidtalk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/120530BelfTelResTbles-14Qs.pdf
3. Northern Ireland was established under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 which partitioned
Ireland, creating two separate governments in the North and South of the island. Cyprus has
been ‘de facto’ partitioned since 1974. The international community recognises only the
Republic of Cyprus but not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which was
declared unilaterally in 1983.
4. The Sunningdale Agreement established a power-sharing executive between moderate Nation-
alist and Unionist parties, which fell in 1974 after the Ulster Worker’s Council, supported by
anti-Sunningdale Unionists, declared a strike bringing Northern Ireland to a standstill (Walker
2004).
5. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement established a power-sharing government with an
arbitration role for the British and Irish governments and crucially had the support of hard-
line Nationalists and some hard-line Unionists (McGarry and O’Leary 2009).
6. More developed than earlier peace proposals, the Annan Plan outlined the structure of gover-
nance under a federated Cyprus, as well as proposals for dealing with every single detail of
administration in a reunited Cyprus (Yakinthou 2009).
7. The 1998 Agreement allows for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK or to become part
of Ireland should a majority in Northern Ireland and Ireland wish either scenario to be so.
8. Interviews with UUP Member of the European Parliament Jim Nicholson and former UUP
adviser Dr Brian Crowe (2009).
9. Proposed greater British–Irish government cooperation and an ‘Irish dimension’ granting the
Irish government a greater say in Northern Irish affairs.
10. Interview with DUP Party Support Clive McFarland (2010).
11. Decommissioning refers to the handing over of weapons by paramilitary groups, such as the Irish
Republican Army (linked with Sinn Féin) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (Unionist militants).
12. Unionists were also facing an existential threat, through the principle of consent. Interview
with academics and activists David Ofﬁcer and Yiouli Taki, Index Cyprus (2010).
13. NI Life and Times (2003): http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2003/Political_Attitudes/REFORMOK.
html
14. Interview with Queen’s University Belfast academic Professor Graham Walker (2010).
15. Interview with Graham Walker (2010) and Peter Weir, DUP MLA (2009).
16. In 1972, the British government imposed direct rule in response to the worsening security sit-
uation, meaning governance in Northern Ireland was carried out by the Northern Ireland
Ofﬁce in Westminster.
17. This agreement updated the 1998 Belfast Agreement, abandoning the cross-community voting
procedure for First Minister and Deputy First Minister. They would instead be drawn from
the largest parties, saving the hard-line parties from voting for each other’s candidate.
18. Interview with Graham Walker (2010).
19. Interview with Clive McFarland (2010).
20. Annan Plan V was put forward in simultaneous referendums in the Greek Cypriot and Turk-
ish Cypriot communities; a 65 per cent majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Plan in the
April 2004 referendum.

























21. The Enosis (Union) movement represented an aspiration among Greek Cypriots to unite with
the Greek ‘motherland’, and was categorically opposed by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots
(Kitromilides 1979).
22. The EOKA B organisation was one of the forces in the internal ﬁghting among Greek
Cypriots before 1974. It campaigned against President Makarios and sought the abolition of
the Republic of Cyprus, aiming for immediate uniﬁcation with Greece (Papadakis 1998).
23. Interviews with DISY former members of parliament Katie Clerides, Christos Pourgourides,
Christos Stylianides; former and current presidents of the party Glafkos Clerides and Nikos
Anastasiades (2009).
24. EUROKO subsequently absorbed another party from the right, the New Horizons (NEO).
25. Interview with Nikos Anastasiades (2009).
26. Interview with Yiouli Taki and David Ofﬁcer (2010).
27. Interview with Katie Clerides (2009).
28. See survey data from Kaymak et al. (2008).
29. For instance, a 65 per cent majority deemed the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation ‘tolerable’
or ‘satisfactory’. UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) Survey (2007):
http://www.cypruspolls.org/SurveyUNFICYP.pdf
30. Interview Glafcos Clerides (2009); Nicos Anastasiades (2009); DISY’s international secretary
Alexandros Sinka (2010).
31. 63 per cent deemed a continuation of the status quo ‘entirely unacceptable’ in the Cyprus
2015 poll (2009): http://www.cyprus2015.org/
32. Interview with DISY’s Policy Director, Christoforos Fokaides (2012).
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